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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Bradley Joseph Vanzant appeals from the summary dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Vanzant filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction
for possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp. 4-11.) He asserted that his
guilty plea was not legally valid and was the product of ineffective assistance of
counsel, that his counsel conducted an inadequate investigation of the case, that
some unspecified “policy and practice” of the public defender’s office prejudiced
him, and that appellate counsel was ineffective. (R., p. 5.) In his affidavit he
specified that he was asserting his counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion
to suppress evidence of a warrantless search of his car. (R., p. 9.) The attached
police report shows that police stopped Vanzant at about 1:00 a.m. for not having
the lights of his truck on. (R., p. 13.) Officers later arrested him for driving
without privileges. (Id.) The passenger reported that Vanzant had placed “drugs
of some sort” in a panel of the driver’s door. (Id.) A drug dog subsequently
alerted on the car. (R., p. 14.) A search of the door where the passenger
indicated Vanzant had placed his drugs resulted in the discovery of a baggie and
a bindle that both contained methamphetamine. (Id.) The methamphetamine
“with its packaging” weighed 2.4 grams. (Id.)
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The district court granted Vanzant’s motion requesting appointment of
counsel, and a conflict counsel for the public defender appeared in the case.
(R., pp. 35-37, 39, 44-45.)
The state filed an answer and motion for summary disposition asserting
Vanzant had failed to support his claims with evidence or that his claims were
disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings. (R., pp. 46-66.) Vanzant,
through appointed counsel, filed a response. (R., pp. 76-82.) The district court
held a hearing on the motion at which both counsel presented argument.
(R., p. 83; Tr., p. 4, L. 15 – p. 11, L. 9.) The district court orally granted the
motion, finding the claims either unsupported by evidence or disproven by the
record of the underlying criminal case.

(Tr., p. 11, L. 10 – p. 13, L. 14.)

However, the district court gave Vanzant 20 additional days to respond to
dismissal of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to
suppress and regarding the unspecified policy and practice of the public
defender’s office. (Tr., p. 13, L. 15 – p. 15, L. 2.)
Twenty-three days later Vanzant filed a pro se “Motion for Conflict Free
Counsel.” (R., pp. 84-86.) Vanzant claimed his appointed attorney had “taken
the position of the prosecuting attorney” and “refused to assist me in presenting
my claim to the Court.” (R., p. 85.) In support of this allegation he presented a
letter from his attorney in which his attorney stated he could not ethically present
Vanzant’s claims because they lacked a good faith basis in fact or law.
(R., pp. 85, 87.)
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A few days after Vanzant filed his motion, the district court entered an
order granting the state’s motion and summarily dismissing the petition.
(R., pp. 88-104.) The district court denied the motion for “conflict free” counsel in
a footnote on the basis that the constitutional right to counsel did not apply.
(R., p. 89, n. 2.) The district court entered judgment, from which Vanzant timely
appealed. (R., pp. 105-11.)
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ISSUES
Vanzant states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Vanzant’s motion for
conflict free counsel without holding a hearing on or
conducting any inquiry into the basis for his motion?

2.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Vanzant’s motion for
conflict free counsel on the basis that Mr. Vanzant did not
have a right to effective assistance of counsel?

3.

Did the record before the district court support its denial of
Mr. Vanzant’s motion for conflict free counsel?

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 2-3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Vanzant failed to show any error in the district court’s denial of his
motion for “conflict free” counsel?
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ARGUMENT
Vanzant Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His
Motion For “Conflict Free” Counsel
A.

Introduction
Vanzant claimed his appointed post-conviction attorney had a “conflict”

and moved for “conflict free” counsel. (R., pp. 84-86.) The “conflict” was that
appointed counsel refused to pursue claims that could not be made in good faith.
(R., p. 87.) The district court denied the motion. (R., p. 89, n. 2.)
On appeal Vanzant asserts that the district court erred. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 3-10.) He first contends that “[t]he failure of the district court to allow[1] a
hearing or at least make some sort of inquiry into Mr. Vanzant’s assertion that his
counsel was laboring under a conflict violated the constitutional guarantee of due
process.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-7.) He next contends that the district court
“confused conflict-free counsel” with “effective counsel.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 78.)

Finally, he argues that the record “does not support the conclusion that

counsel was not laboring under a conflict.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.) None of
these arguments withstands scrutiny.
B.

Standard Of Review
In a post-conviction proceeding, “[t]he decision to grant or deny a request

for court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court.”
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004) (citation
omitted). “[T]he decision of whether to appoint substitute counsel lies within the
1

Vanzant did not request a hearing. (R., pp. 84-86.) Thus the district court did
not “fail to allow” a hearing.
5

discretion of the trial court and will only be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”
State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, 887, 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 2012). On
review, the appellate court must determine whether the district court “acted within
the boundaries of its discretion, consistent with any legal standards applicable to
its specific choices, and whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason.” State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App.
1994).
C.

Vanzant Has Not Shown He Was Entitled To A Hearing On His Motion
The right to conflict-free representation derives from the Sixth Amendment

as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1931). The Sixth Amendment
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel during all “critical stages” of
the adversarial proceedings against him. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562,
149 P.3d 833, 837 (2006) (citations omitted). Although this right encompasses
the first direct appeal, it does not extend to post-conviction proceedings.
Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007); Pennsylvania v. Finley,
481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).

See also Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 394,

327 P.3d 365, 370 (2014) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752
(1991)) (“‘[T]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings.’”); Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 616, 315 P.3d 798, 804 (2013)
(“[T]he right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings is not a constitutional
right.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
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As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, a post-conviction petition is a
civil proceeding and so provides the clearest example of a proceeding to which
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the correlative right to conflict-free
counsel, do not apply. See Hall, 155 Idaho at 616, 315 P.3d at 804. Because
Vanzant lacks a Sixth Amendment right to counsel to pursue his post-conviction
petition, the district court also had no free-standing duty to inquire into any
alleged conflict of interest.

Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 343-344,

160 P.3d 1275, 1278-1279 (Ct. App. 2007) (procedures required to rule on a
request for substitute counsel made by a criminal defendant with a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel do not apply in post-conviction proceedings).
At a minimum, due process does not require a hearing on a request for
substitute post-conviction counsel where a “written motion adequately apprised
the district court of the basis for [the] request.” Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 343,
160 P.3d at 1278. Here the motion adequately apprised the district court of the
basis for the request: counsel’s refusal to pursue claims he did not think he could
in good faith ethically pursue. (R., pp. 84-87.) That there was no good faith
basis for claiming that trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a suppression
motion is fully supported by the record showing reasonable suspicion for the
traffic stop (failure to turn on front or rear lights) and probable cause for
searching the car (the passenger’s report of drugs in the car and a hit by a drug
dog). (R., pp. 13-14.) Deciding the motion for “conflict free” counsel without a
hearing did not violate Vanzant’s due process rights.
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Vanzant next argues that when post-conviction counsel operates under a
conflict he is not only “ineffective,” he is “ineligible to be appointed at all.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.) This argument fails for several reasons, including but
not limited to the fact it is “not supported by any cogent argument or authority.”
Hart v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 154 Idaho 621, 625, 301 P.3d 627, 631 (2012)
(quotations omitted). The argument also fails on the merits. Vanzant was not
entitled to a hearing because he changed his argument (on appeal) from one of
ineffective assistance of counsel because of a conflict of interest to a claim of
ineligibility of counsel because of a conflict of interest. Either way, his motion
failed to set forth a prima facie claim of a conflict, so no hearing was required.
Finally Vanzant contends the record “does not support the conclusion that
counsel was not laboring under a conflict of interest and thus did not support the
denial of the motion for appointment of conflict free counsel.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 9-10.) Wading through the thicket of negatives, Vanzant seems to be arguing
that because the record does not show the absence of a conflict, “this Court must
either find that the motion was well-founded and must be granted, or in the
alternative, that the district court must conduct a hearing or other inquiry into the
basis of the motion” in order to develop a record showing a conflict. (Id.) The
argument that a trial court’s only options when the record does not establish the
claims in a motion are to grant the motion or conduct a hearing until those claims
are proved is unsupported by any relevant legal authority, and should thus be
disregarded. Hart, 154 Idaho at 625, 301 P.3d at 631. The argument overlooks
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the most obvious option where a movant fails to establish a claim, which is to
deny the motion.
In this case the district court had dismissed most of Vanzant’s postconviction claims, but had granted 20 days for Vanzant to supplement any
response in relation to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
move to suppress and regarding an unspecified policy and practice of the public
defender’s office. (Tr., p. 13, L. 15 – p. 15, L. 2.) Counsel provided Vanzant a
letter stating he did not intend to present any additional response to the pending
dismissal of those claims because he could not in good faith and ethically do so.
(R., pp. 85, 87.)

Vanzant’s claim that this made counsel effectively the

prosecutor, and thus created a conflict of interests, was specious. The district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Vanzant’s motion for “conflict free”
counsel without ordering some sort of hearing on the motion because there was
no prima facie showing of any potential conflict. Vanzant has failed to show
error.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal
of Vanzant’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 24th day of October, 2016.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_____
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of October, 2016, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
DEBORAH WHIPPLE
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
at the following email addresses: dwhipple@nbmlaw.com and lm@nbmlaw.com.

KKJ/dd

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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